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JURISDICTION
Appellee Bradley Scott does not disagree with Appellant Jillian Scott’s
jurisdictional statement.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Whether the court of appeals erred in determining Utah Code §
30-3-5(10) permits a finding of cohabitation warranting a termination of alimony
when that cohabitation has ceased prior to the filing or adjudication of a petition
for termination of alimony?
Standard of Review:

“On certiorari, [this Court] review[s] for

correctness the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the district
court.” Turner v. Univ. of Utah Hosp. & Clinics, 2013 UT 52, ¶ 13, 310 P.3d
1212. In reviewing a determination of cohabitation, an appellate court “defer[s] to
the trial court’s factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous,”
and reviews “its ultimate conclusion [of cohabitation] for correctness.” Levin v.
Carlton-Levin, 2014 UT App 3, ¶ 9, 318 P.3d 1177 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Myers v. Myers, 2011 UT 65, ¶¶ 32 & 37, 266 P.3d 806
(same).
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the court of appeals, see
Scott v. Scott, 2016 UT App. 31, ¶ 30-37, 368 P.3d 133, but was not preserved in
the trial court.
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ISSUE 2:

Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and

application of the term domicile within the standard set forth in Haddow v.
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), and Myers v. Myers, 2011 UT 65, 266 P.3d
806, for ascertaining the establishment of a common residence.
Standard of Review: The interpretation of this Court’s prior
precedent is reviewed for correctness. Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, ¶ 6, 169
P.3d 441.
Preservation: This issue was preserved. Scott, 2016 UT App. 31, ¶¶
16-20.
ISSUE 3:

Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and

application of a temporary or brief period of time within the standard set forth in
Haddow and Myers.
Standard of Review: The interpretation of this Court’s prior
precedent is reviewed for correctness. Ellis, 2007 UT 77, ¶ 6.
Preservation: This issue was preserved. Scott, 2016 UT App. 31, ¶¶
21-27.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10):
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case, course of proceeding, and disposition below
Jillian Scott and Bradley Scott divorced in 2006. Approximately two years
later, Ms. Scott entered into a long-term intimate relationship with a man named
James Okland.1 In 2011, Mr. Scott learned about the relationship, including that Ms.
Scott had been living with J.O. Mr. Scott filed a petition for termination of alimony
pursuant to Utah Code § 30-3-5(10). (R.2237.)
A trial was held in 2013.

The court heard testimony from several live

witnesses, including Ms. Scott and J.O., and reviewed dozens of exhibits. (R.223738, R.3050.) The court noted that there are generally two elements of cohabitation:
(1) common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing conjugal association.

It

was undisputed that the latter element was present. The question for the court, then,
was whether J.O. and Ms. Scott established a “common residency.” (R.2259.)

1

Mr. Okland, a principal of Okland Construction at the time, is not a party to this
proceeding, and has since remarried. As a non-party, use of Mr. Okland’s name
and the resulting loss of privacy seem unnecessary in public filings. Accordingly,
Mr. Scott refers to Mr. Okland hereafter as “J.O.”
3

In weighing “common residency,” the trial court considered evidence of
several factors, including (a) access to the residence and independent comings and
goings, (b) shared decisions, (c) the length and the continuity of the relationship, (d)
shared meals, (e) keeping clothing in the same home, etc. (R.2259-2260.) The court
concluded that the couple had established a common residency and had cohabitated
under the Cohabitation Statute.

The trial court drafted a 36-page decision

summarizing the couple’s relationship and facts it found relevant to its cohabitation
determination. (R.2237.) The court noted that the record was too extensive for it to
note every fact that was relevant to its findings. (R.2271.) Ms. Scott appealed.
In the court of appeals, Ms. Scott made three arguments. First, she claimed
that she could not have cohabitated with J.O. because she maintained a separate
home in Salt Lake City. Second, she claimed that she did not live with J.O. long
enough to constitute cohabitation under the Statute. Third, she claimed that the
Cohabitation Statute required present cohabitation and that she was no longer living
with J.O. Scott, 2016 UT App. 31.
Relying on this Court’s precedent (as well as its own precedent), the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the couple established a common
residency when they jointly purchased a home together in Rancho Santa Fe,
California and moved into that home for purposes of establishing a marriage-like
relationship. Id., ¶¶ 24, 37.
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Although the couple ultimately separated, the court of appeals was not
persuaded that the six-week period that the couple lived together in the Rancho Santa
Fe home was too short a period to extrapolate a “common residency.” To conclude
otherwise, the court found, would be to ignore (among other things) the longstanding
nature of the couple’s relationship and that by moving into that home Ms. Scott and
J.O. both intended to “deliberate[ly] escalat[e] their relationship to something akin to
marriage with all of the trappings of cohabitation.” Id., ¶ 24.

The court also

concluded that the plain language of the statute did not require a finding that
cohabitation is presently occurring. Id., ¶ 36.
Although the trial court held the couple cohabited as early as December 22, the
court of appeals adjusted this date to February 17, which is when the couple moved
into the Rancho Santa Fee home. Id., ¶ 26.
FACTS
Background Facts
Mr. and Ms. Scott were married May 12, 1979. During their marriage, the
couple accumulated a significant amount of wealth, and were able to “live[] a
lifestyle beyond even the imagination of most of humanity.” (R.777-78.) The
marriage was not a happy one, and once most of their children were at or
approaching adulthood, the Scotts divorced. (R.762.)
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Mr. and Ms. Scott entered into a written Stipulated Settlement Agreement
setting forth the division of marital property and support obligations of the parties.
(R.838.) This Stipulation was approved and adopted by the trial court. Id. A Final
Decree of Divorce was entered on August 7, 2006. Pursuant to the Stipulation and
the Divorce Decree, the parties agreed that Ms. Scott would receive, among other
things, $2.4 million as an adjustment to the division of marital property, half of the
proceeds received from the sale of the couple’s $3.3 million home (minus marital
liabilities), $6,000 a month in alimony equal to the number of years of the parties’
marriage, and $2,000 a month in child support. (R.839, 841, 844, 784, 846-849.)
Mr. Scott was also ordered to pay half of his children’s medical expenses, private
schooling, and college tuition. (R.839, 840.) The parties stipulated, and the Decree
stated, that alimony would terminate “upon the remarriage or cohabitation of Ms.
Scott.” (R.841.)
Ms. Scott’s alleged economic needs were “far removed from reality.” (R.778.)
After the divorce decree was entered, Ms. Scott filed several motions with the court
arguing that she was entitled to more money under the decree than Mr. Scott was
allegedly providing. The divorce court found that some of these motions had merit.
(See, e.g., R.1057, 883-889 (Ms. Scott was correct that Mr. Scott owed her $100 for
SAT and ACT tests taken by their daughter); R.1819, 1161-1266 (Mr. Scott should
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not have deducted medical insurance paid for adult daughter from Ms. Scott’s
support obligations when Ms. Scott canceled that daughter’s policy).)
Most of Ms. Scott’s arguments, however, were rejected by the court.

(See,

e.g., R.1056-1060, 868-871 (disregarding Ms. Scott’s complaint of untimeliness filed
when Mr. Scott was four days late on a support obligation); R.1820-21, 1267-1268
(rejecting Ms. Scott’s argument that Mr. Scott was required to reimburse Ms. Scott
for more expense than she had actually incurred for college room and board); R.
1822, 1161-1266 (declining to hold Mr. Scott in contempt for not reimbursing Ms.
Scott for medical and tuition bills for which she had not provided supporting
documentation).)
The divorce court never found Mr. Scott to be in contempt of the divorce
decree. By contrast, the court did sanction Ms. Scott for her own violation of the
decree. (R.1452, 1443, ¶¶ 5-7.) The court noted that most of the problems of which
Ms. Scott complained were the result of a breakdown in communication. (R.1855,
1835.) Ms. Scott’s emails were laced with personal insults, which made such
communication difficult.

(See, e.g., R.965 (email to Mr. Scott calling him a

“coward” and his assistant “fat”), R.963 (email to Mr. Scott’s assistant calling her
“ugly”); see also R.3050, p. 12:3-17) (after the divorce, Ms. Scott sent mutual friend
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Stuart Weissman a “very nasty” email about Mr. Scott and demanded that he choose
between her and Mr. Scott).)2
Ms. Scott enters into a de facto marriage with J.O.
At the same time that Ms. Scott was attempting to convince the divorce court
of her financial woes, she had entered into a romantic relationship with a wealthy
man, J.O. “Ms. Scott began an intimate and exclusive relationship with” J.O. for
nearly three years, “beginning in October 2008 and ending in April/May 2011.”
(R.2238.)
J.O. and Ms. Scott’s living arrangements were atypical. Their lifestyle was not
fixed around any “one home” but instead was transient, a lifestyle consisting of
mainly travel and leisure. (R.2270.) The couple’s extraordinary wealth allowed them
the “ability to live in more than one home and travel extensively away from the
numerous homes available to them and they did so.” (Id.) J.O. owned at least three
homes: one in Salt Lake City, Utah; one in Sun Valley, Idaho; and one in Rancho
Santa Fe, California. (R.2238, 2252.) Although unclear, J.O. may also have owned
Ms. Scott represents in her statement of facts that the Scotts’ divorce was
triggered because Ms. Scott found Mr. Scott with another woman (the “June 2004
incident”), and casts various other aspersions. E.g., App. Br., pp. 5. Because the
circumstances of the underlying divorce are immaterial to the present appeal, Mr.
Scott will refrain from responding to Ms. Scott’s personal attacks. As the divorce
court noted, however, the parties had already filed for divorce before June 2004,
and Ms. Scott’s versions of events on this occasion was “exaggerated.” (R. 769,
777.) In any event, the trial court here had ample opportunity to assess Ms. Scott
as a witness; its rejection of most aspects of her factual testimony speaks volumes
about her credibility.
2

8

a home in Arizona. The Rancho Santa Fe home was jointly obtained by Ms. Scott
and J.O. (R.2252.)
Ms. Scott also had a home in Salt Lake but she did not live there. The
probability of actually finding Ms. Scott in Salt Lake was quite low (at most 13-19%,
mathematically stated). (R.2255, 2256.) Instead, Ms. Scott spent both her days and
nights in one of J.O.’s homes or travelling with J.O.:
 “[F]rom November 15, 2010 to May 15, 2011, [Ms. Scott] spent only
31 days in Salt Lake City and she spent 147 days or 81% with [J.O.] or
in a home owned by him.” (R.2256.)
 “Out of a 144 day time period, [Ms. Scott] spent only 19 days in Salt
Lake City, Utah, and spent 125 days or 87% of the time with [J.O.] or in
one of his homes.” (R.2256.)


“During a 28 month time period in their relationship, [J.O.] and [Ms.
Scott] traveled together on some 37 separate occasions.” (R.2261). At
least 17 of these trips were to [J.O.]’s Sun Valley Home. (Id.)
Approximately 13 of these trips were made to California. (Resp. Ex. 12,
pp. 1-2.)

 On May 15, 2010, Ms. Scott commented on Facebook “We spend a lot
of time in Sun Valley in the summer” (R.2239 (emphasis in original).)
Ms. Scott spent so little time at her Salt Lake City house that she complained
when Mr. Scott mailed alimony checks there because, with her “travel and other
commitments,” she was not there often enough to timely deposit the checks.
(R.1684.) Her living arrangements with J.O. were well documented by Ms. Scott on
Facebook and in emails:
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 On July 13, 2010, Ms. Scott wrote, “In LA with my girls, flying back to
SLC this afternoon & then on to Sun Valley for a week. [J.O.] took us
to Grand Wailea for a week for Scarlett’s graduation present. (Scarlett
is [Mr. & Ms. Scott’s] daughter).” (R.2239.)
 “On May 13-14, 2010, [Ms. Scott] commented on Facebook to a friend
in Hawaii, ‘We are flying to Maui on the 11th of June and staying until
the 18th.’ The friend asked if she could come over to see her and [Ms.
Scott] responded ‘We are not taking his plane, we are flying
commercial, otherwise we would fly to Oahu to see you!!!’” (Id.
(emphasis in original).)
 Ms. Scott also spent the night at J.O’s Salt Lake City home when she
was in Salt Lake. J.O. gave her the key code to access his home and she
had the ability to access this home when he was away. (R.2238, 2253,
2261, 2268, 2271.)
 “On July 18, 2010, Ms. Scott wrote, ‘We are planning a trip to [Rancho
Santa Fe, California] on the 19th of August til the 23rd. He does not
know RSF and I want him to fall in love with it so we could have a
home there.’” (R.2239 (emphasis in original).)
 “On January 10, 2011, Ms. Scott commented on Facebook: ‘Off to
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and China for 25 days!! Good
bye snow, Hello Humidity!’” (R.2245.)
 On January 28, 2011, Ms. Scott wrote: “‘Only 2 more nights on the
ship, getting sad to leave, but on the other hand we are looking forward
to RSF!!!’” (R.2245 (emphasis in original).)
J.O. acknowledged that Ms. Scott rarely stayed in her Salt Lake City house,
but instead stayed with him. (R.3050, p. 102:15-21.) They shared a common room
when traveling, and when staying in his various homes. (R.2261.)

On July 18,

2010, Ms. Scott wrote, “We are in Sun Valley for a week now. [J.O.] has a home
here and I love it. Way more than Park City, we either hike, bike or play golf every
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day . . . . I would love to spend my time between Sun Valley and Southern California
with just a few stops in SLC. (R.2239 (emphasis in original).) Because Ms. Scott
was rarely at her Salt Lake home, she arranged that all of her important mail,
including her bills, could be retrieved online. The only mail that came to her Salt
Lake home was junk mail, which she hired a housekeeper to clean out. (R.2256, ¶
120.)
The couple’s living arrangements were particularly clear at the home in
Rancho Santa Fe, California. Sometime in August of 2010, one of Ms. Scott’s
daughters moved to southern California.

(R.2240, ¶ 18.) Around this same time,

Ms. Scott and J.O. began viewing homes in Rancho Santa Fe. (R.2240.) It was
understood that Ms. Scott’s daughter would be able to stay at the Rancho Santa Fe
home during her vacations and summers. (R.2251.)
Ms. Scott contacted Brenda Weissman, a real estate agent in southern
California, and asked her to be the buyer’s agent for Ms. Scott and J.O. Ms.
Weissman and her husband Stuart owned a home at the Bridges in Rancho Santa Fe,
and were friends of both J.O. and Ms. Scott. (R.2238, 2250, 2252, 2264.) Mr.
Weissman “was the designated driver and drove them [J.O. and Ms. Scott] around for
a few months while they looked at property in Rancho Santa Fe[.]” (R.3050, p. 15:29.)
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Ms. Scott put her Salt Lake home on the market in July of 2010 in anticipation
of the move. (R.2239.) Ms. Scott and J.O. had discussions regarding selling Ms.
Scott’s house in terms of selling price and which listing agents she should use:
J, what is the name of the agent at Linda Wolcott’s office you think might be
good for me? Liz, thinks Tom is right on with his appraisal of $630, and that
the most I should list it for would be $699. My neighbors are at $799 and
mine is better! Now they are not selling but to list mine 100k less is a bit
much??? I think $740 would be more appropriate. What do you think? She is
comparing it to the old ones that my neighbor bought up on the hill. Xo.
(R.2264.)
Initially it appeared that Ms. Scott would use the proceeds from her Salt Lake
home to help fund the purchase of the house in southern California. But when Ms.
Scott’s home did not sell during the summer of 2010, J.O. agreed to front the money
and take title of the property himself or through one of his entities. (R.2264.) As
recognized by the trial court, however, Ms. Scott made clear that the California home
was for both J.O. and her, and its purchase was a joint effort:
 On July 27, 2010, Ms. Scott wrote to Ms. Weissman: “That home is
spectacular! But . . . and it’s a big but, we have done big and NEVER want to
go big again. If [J.O.] likes Rancho Santa Fe, and if we decide we would like
a home there, then it would be on a much smaller scale.” (Resp. Ex. 14, p.
2098.)
 On August 31, 2010, Ms. Scott wrote to Ms. Weissman: “This is the house
that has my name all over it! I love it! I have my house up for sale and I’m
putting my lot up as I type! [J.O.] still wants to look at the covenant and get a
feel for everything in the area. I think he even wants to look at the Del Mar
Country club. I like the Bridges but $2,000 a month in dues is a bit steep and I
have to belong to a golf course.” (Resp. Ex. 14, p. 10.)
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 On September 2, 2010, Ms. Scott wrote Ms. Weissman and told her she would
let her know which of the homes she liked, and that she had stopped
considering the home from the Del Mar Country Club. (Resp. Ex. 14, p. 13.)
 On September 13, 2010, Ms. Scott wrote: “As you know from lunch it’s really
up to [J.O.] at this point. He has fallen in love with the area so now it’s just
talking to his ‘finance guy.’ As you can tell he is very conservative with his
money and does not like debt. He made the comment ‘we pay cash for
everything. We only financed a part of the plane!’ So after just writing the
big check to the x he is a little skiddish about getting into debt 4 a home for me
& Scarlett!! He loves me and told me last night ‘you always get what you
want.’ I want him to want this too. So I’m not pushing too hard on him. He
knows the house will not stay on the market too long so I’m sure he will make
an offer soon. Keep your fingers crossed! I’ve wanted to be here for a long
time. Maybe it was not supposed to happen until now. I told [J.O.] on the golf
course I want to grow old here. Here with you. He agreed!” (Resp. Ex. 14, p.
16.)
 On September 14, 2010, Ms. Scott wrote Ms. Weissman: “We cannot go over
2.5. Do [you] think they would go for that? Gotta get my ass to rancho santa
fe. I love it there. I hate. Hate salt lake city!!” (Resp. Ex. 14, p. 18.)
 On September 22, 2010, Ms. Scott wrote Ms. Weissman: “Don’t waste your
time in Fairbanks Ranch, we want the covenant or my dream home in the
Bridges.” (Resp. Ex. 14, p. 19.)
 On October 7, 2010, J.O. wrote Ms. Weissman: “The offer and addendum
look fine. Jill and I would like to offer $2,125,000 all cash and close within 15
days. It may appear that this is a low ball offer based on the listing price,
however we feel that this offer is what the house is worth.” (Resp. Ex. 14, p.
24.)
 On December 2, 2010, Ms. Scott told [J.O.] regarding the counter offer on the
home in Rancho Santa Fe: “I love being there with you, but I only want us to
do this deal if YOU love being there TOO. If you see yourself walking the
neighborhood, golfing the course, swimming in the pool when we have little
guest, etc. It’s a lifestyle for US, for OUR future.” (Resp. Ex. 42.)
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On November 10, 2010, Ms. Scott implemented a change of mailing address
from her Salt Lake house to a P.O. Box. (R.1647.) Ms. Scott and J.O. finalized the
purchase of their home in Rancho Santa Fe in mid-December, and the purchase
closed in January 2011. (R.2243, 2266.) Ms. Scott and J.O. were traveling together
in Arizona, Sun Valley, and then in Asia while the purchase was finalized. (R.22432245.)
The couple had to stop in Salt Lake for a short period so that they could jointly
arrange for the shipment of personal items, cars, and furniture from their Salt Lake
City houses to the Rancho Santa Fe Home. (R.2245.) “On February 11, 2011, [J.O.]
told [Ms. Scott] that they may have to stay in Salt Lake for a few more days and the
plan was to get Redman loaded with everything they wanted to ship and get it on the
way.” (Id.) J.O. also arranged to “have his Porsche shipped, with the timing for it to
get in Rancho Santa Fe within a day or two of their arrival.” (Id.)
J.O. and Ms. Scott flew to Rancho Santa Fe on J.O.’s private plane with their
linens, computers, and whatever clothes that they wanted to take. (R.2245, 2246.)
They physically moved into the Rancho Santa Fe home on February 17, 2011.
(R.2246.) Ms. Scott wrote: “This is heaven! I have to pinch myself to make sure I’m
not dreaming. [J.O.] and I love it here, even in the rain.” (Resp. Ex. 11, p. 3.)
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Ms. Scott treats J.O.’s various homes as her own
Ms. Scott and J.O. worked together to furnish and arrange utilities for the
Rancho Santa Fe home. On January 7, Ms. Scott wrote J.O.: “I got the cable pending
the sellers disconnect call, the water is done, starting February 1st. You have to call
on the gas & electric (unless we want my name on the account). (R.2244 (emphasis
in original).) J.O. asked that Ms. Scott ensure that all of the utilities for the RSF
home be in J.O.’s trust’s name with a billing address at his construction company.
(Id.)
Ms. Scott bought décor for the RSF home. (R.2245; also R.3050, pp. 2021:22-1) (“numerous times she [Ms. Scott] told us they’re planning on trips and
planning on decorating the house together and she was taking furniture out of the
house and replacing it because [J.O.’s] taste was mediocre, and I mean, she was
acting like a spouse”).)
Ms. Scott had her furniture and personal items shipped to the house from Salt
Lake at J.O.’s expense. (R.2246) Ms. Scott and J.O. had discussions regarding what
furniture they were going to keep from the previous owners in their Rancho Santa Fe
home, and shopped for and purchased a couch together for the home. (R.2244,
2247). Ms. Scott helped with landscaping decisions. (Resp. Ex. 14, p. 2197.) She
arranged for the home to be cleaned and for the purchase of cleaning supplies.
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(R.2246.) She made decisions regarding who should have keys to that home. (Resp.
Ex. 14, p. 2235.)
The Rancho Santa Fe home was intended to be the couple’s joint residence,
which in fact was fulfilled when they both moved in. (R.2265.) J. O. confirmed that
“[Ms. Scott] stayed there the same time that I did.” (Id.) Ms. Scott also continued
listing her Salt Lake City home for sale and represented that she would be staying in
Rancho Santa Fe from then on. (R.2251; R.3050, p. 52:19-9; Resp. Ex. 29; Resp. Ex.
42.) She had no intent to return to Salt Lake City. (Resp. Ex. 31; R.2251, 2253.)3
Ms. Scott could come and go from the Rancho Santa Fe home as she pleased.
(R.2266, 2267.) She had a key to the home and stayed there even when J.O. was not
there. (Id.) Her friend Ms. Weissman testified that the couple lived together even
while the house in Rancho Santa Fe was being purchased. According to Ms.
Weissman, “[t]hey certainly lived together” from the “time they purchased the
property until about May of that year.” (R.3050, p. 20:10-16.)
Ms. Scott was not a mere guest in any of J.O.’s homes. She was given the
garage door opener and the key code to J.O.’s Salt Lake City home and kept personal
effects there. (R.3050, p. 82:5-8; Id., p. 200:15-20.) She spent the night there. (Id.,

Despite Ms. Scott’s acknowledgments in both her emails and statements to others
that she intended to live at the Rancho Santa Fe home, at trial, Ms. Scott testified
otherwise at trial—claiming that she had no intention of living at that house.
(R.3050, p. 212:22-25.)
3

16

p. 163:14-16.) She had access to and the ability to come and go from that home as
she pleased. (R.2261; R.3050, p. 81:15-21; id., p. 200:15-20.)
Ms. Scott could also come and go at will at the Sun Valley home when the
couple was in Idaho. She had a key code to access that house. (R.3050, p. 200:2123.) She kept her clothes (including winter clothes and sporting equipment) there.
(R.2254.)

Ms. Scott helped J.O. purchase items for and decorate the Sun Valley

home on special occasions. (See, e.g., R.2262 (listed on charge account for grocery
store); R.2244 (purchasing Christmas garland and other decorations for Sun Valley
home).)
J.O. and Ms. Scott represent that they live together full time
The home that J.O. and Ms. Scott purchased in Rancho Santa Fe was part of a
golf community. (R.2244, 2266.) Upon arriving there, J.O. submitted the forms
associated with both his and Ms. Scott’s club status. (R.2267.) He was informed by
the club as early as December 23, 2010, that Ms. Scott could have “Family Status”
on his club membership if they were “living together and maintaining a common
household.” (Id.; R.2247.)
“This designation is not insignificant from the perspective of the Bridges
Country Club that [J.O.] belonged to (in connection with the Rancho Santa Fe home)
and it was considered to be tantamount to and equal to a spouse according to the
testimony of Mr. Weissman, who is also a member of the Club.” (R.2267.) Any
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person designated with this status “must reside with the member on a full time
permanent basis.” (R.2247, ¶¶ 55, 57.) On the club application, J.O. listed Ms. Scott
as the person with “family status.” (Id.) He had the club application and was ready
to submit it as early as December 23, 2010. (R.2244, ¶ 40; Resp. Ex. 14, p. 40.)
Ms. Scott knew that her membership privileges at Rancho Santa Fe would
terminate if she failed “to continue residence with the member.”

(R.2247.) Ms.

Scott and J.O. enjoyed the benefits of their membership at Rancho Santa Fe.
(R.2267.) As a member of the Bridges club, Ms. Scott “enjoyed golf, cocktails, she
could charge services, dinners, lunches at the club, attend club events and she wanted
to be on a golf team.” (R.2250, ¶ 77.)
J.O. is also a member of the Salt Lake Country Club. Records provided by the
Salt Lake Country Club indicated that J.O. also designated Ms. Scott as his
“significant other” at that club for 2010 and 2011. (R.2267.)
J.O. and Ms. Scott share common household duties
Joint finances/purchase decisions
J.O. paid the expenses associated with the couple’s lifestyle, including meals
and lodging starting in 2008. (R.2262, 2238.) Ms. Scott, in turn, helped J.O. arrange
and keep track of his finances and orchestrate the couple’s joint purchase decisions.
J.O. had Ms. Scott listed as an authorized user on his credit cards with no restrictions.
(R.2262, 2247.) According to J.O., Ms. Scott had permission to use his card in the
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same capacity as he would give his (present) wife: Ms. Scott could make personal
purchases (clothing, jewelry, etc.) as long as she had his permission in advance or
J.O. was with her. (R.3050, p. 179:5-22.) For other necessities (gas, groceries,
lodging, etc.), no such permission was required. (See, e.g., R.2238, ¶ 8.)
Ms. Scott used J.O.’s credit cards for gas, groceries, entertainment, auctions,
trips together, lodging, and other major purchases. (R.2262.) She would book
airlines and hotels for the both of them. (Resp. Ex. 28, p. 1.) She was also in charge
of and had permission to use J.O.’s cards to purchase wedding gifts, Christmas and
birthday gifts, and gifts for the couple’s grandchildren. (R.2254.) During the
couple’s travels, both Ms. Scott and her children charged expenses to J.O.’s card.
(Id.) Ms. Scott was also listed as a permitted user on J.O.’s charge account at
Atkinson’s, a grocery store in Sun Valley. (R.2262.)
J.O. also paid other expenses of Ms. Scott’s. During their relationship, J.O.
suggested that Ms. Scott have a breast augmentation procedure. J.O. was involved in
the decision-making process regarding which doctor to use and the extent of the
augmentation, he attended the initial consult, and he paid the $18,000 bill. (R.2254,
2263; Resp. Ex. 44.)

When Ms. Scott obtained an infection related to this

procedure, J.O. paid the medical expenses associated with the treatment of the
infection. (R.3050, p. 199:20-23; Resp. Ex. 4, p.22.)
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Ms. Scott helped J.O. keep track of the account numbers and expiration dates
on his credit cards. For example, Ms. Scott helped him change some automatic
charges from one card to another. (R.2243, ¶ 31.)
When it came to the couple’s joint purchase of the Rancho Santa Fe home,
Ms. Scott arranged for the realtor. (R.2266.) She was involved in the decisions
regarding the type of home the couple would purchase, and was responsible for
selecting and presenting to J.O. for approval those homes that met the couple’s joint
requirements. (Id.) She was primarily responsible for picking out the location, and
very much wanted the home to be in Rancho Santa Fe. (Id.)
Ms. Scott and J.O. share holidays and other major events together
Ms. Scott and J.O. celebrated holidays and special events together. (R.2269.)
On October 31, 2010, Ms. Scott informed J.O. that she had just bought their tickets
for Los Angeles for Thanksgiving. (R.2243.)

On December 26, 2010, Ms. Scott

posted pictures of Christmas in Sun Valley and commented on Facebook: “Sun
Valley Christmas” and “Christmas in Sun Valley—with Noelle.” (Noelle is Mr. and
Ms. Scott’s daughter.) (R.2244.)
In January 2011, J.O. and Ms. Scott went on a 25-day cruise which coincided
with J.O.’s retirement. (R.2262.) The couple took Ms. Scott’s daughter Scarlett to
Grand Wailea in Hawaii to celebrate Scarlett’s graduation. (Id.) “[J.O.], consistent
with his view of the relationship with Petitioner, treated her children by giving them
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substantial financial gifts at appropriate occasions and enjoying holidays and travel
with them, as well as Ms. Scott.” (Id.) J.O. paid to ship Scarlett’s car to California
for college, and gave her $5,000 as a graduation gift. Id.
During Ms. Scott’s relationship with J.O., her alimony becomes “fun money”
J.O. proposed marriage to Ms. Scott in Liberty Park in August or September
2010. (R.2263.) He told Ms. Scott that he had bought her a diamond, and instructed
her and Ms. Scott’s daughter to pick out a setting. (Id.) In a letter to Ms. Weissman,
Ms. Scott stated, “we talked about marriage but I am not ready to give up my
alimony . . . . I lowered my alimony so that when I did fall in love with a man it
would be easy to give up that extra ‘fun money.’” (Resp. Ex. 14, p. 8.)4
Ms. Weissman’s perception was that Ms. Scott considered her alimony
payments “discretion[ary]” money. (R.3050, p. 50:10-18.) Ms. Scott and J.O.
contemplated how Ms. Scott could use these alimony payments, and J.O. suggested
that she could invest them in a Roth IRA. (R.2263-2264.) On November 1, 2010,
Ms. Scott endorsed the back of one of her alimony checks from Mr. Scott “hahahaha
ha.” (R.2243.)

A binder titled “Respondent’s Trial Exhibits” is part of the record but has not
been marked with a record number.
4
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(Resp. Ex. 13, p. 1.)5
Both J.O. and Ms. Scott were aware of the consequences that getting married
would have on Ms. Scott’s alimony payments, and told “third parties on three
different occasions the reason why they were not married was because they knew
[Ms. Scott’s] alimony would terminate.”

(R.3019.)

J.O. admitted to Stuart

Weissman that he and Ms. Scott were buying a home that the couple would live in
for the rest of their lives, but that he did not want Ms. Scott to lose her alimony and
that is why they were not getting married. (Id.) On another occasion during the
summer of 2010, J.O. stated to Mr. Weissman that he didn’t want to get married right
away because he didn’t want Jill to lose her alimony. (Id.) Ms. Scott also indicated
Ms. Scott’s brief provides a new explanation for the “hahahahaha” endorsement.
(App. Br. 13). At trial, Ms. Scott testified:
Q: (By Mr. Green) What did you intend by [ha, ha, ha, ha, ha]?
A: Nothing. Scribble, you know.
Q: You didn’t intend anything by it?
A: No.
(R.3050, p.208:10-16.)
5
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that the reason that the couple was not married is because she did not want to lose her
alimony. (Id.)
J.O. & Ms. Scott separate as though they were married
J.O. and Ms. Scott physically moved into and stayed in the Rancho Santa Fe
home for approximately six weeks together, beginning sometime around February
2011. (R.2270.) In April 2011, while J.O. was away, he informed Ms. Scott that he
wanted to end the relationship. (R.2256.) At this same time, J.O. told Ms. Scott that
she could keep his credit cards for now and continue to use them to buy gas and
groceries. (R.2247.)
Even after this communication, Ms. Scott continued to act as though the
Rancho Santa Fe home was hers. On April 10, 2011, Ms. Scott posted on Facebook
a picture of herself in the pool and tub and commented: “Just another Sunday in
Sunny California.” She also posted a picture of the yard and wrote: “I love my rose
garden.” (R.2247 (emphasis in original).)
On April 11, 2011, Ms. Scott told J.O. to send all of her clothes and
belongings from his Sun Valley home to her:
Please have Leslie send all my clothes and belongings from Sun Valley,
I was planning on getting them sometime this summer, but if you want
to ship them that’s okay with me. I have extra ski clothes in the guest
bedroom closet along with gators, goggles and gloves. My golf clubs
and golf shoes, too please. I don’t need the snowshoes/boots you just
bought me.
(R.2261.)
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She also told J.O. that she was not moving back to Utah. (Resp. Ex. 31.) On
April 13, 2011, Ms. Scott wrote to J.O.: “You asked me to marry you, to spend my
life with you. I introduce you to Rancho Santa Fe and dream of mine to live here,
you buy a dream home for us to share our lives in. (along with all our children). We
decorate it with my furniture and furniture we pick out together.” (Resp. Ex. 29.)
Around this same time, Ms. Scott decided to go on a shopping spree with
J.O.’s credit cards, spending at least $4,000 on clothing, jewelry, etc. (R.2248, also
R.3050, p. 28:7-20 ($2,000 on wine).)

When J.O. confronted her about the

purchases, Ms. Scott reminded him that she was an authorized user on his account.
(Resp. Ex. 28, p. 2.) J.O. expressed concern that he could no longer trust her, and
indicated that he wanted her out of the Rancho Santa Fe house and was canceling his
credit cards. (Id., p. 3.)
J.O. and Ms. Scott started discussions on a financial settlement relating to their
relationship. (R.2248.) “These negotiations were over potential legal rights and
obligations owed one to the other arising out of their relationship.” (R.2268; see also
R.3050, p. 26:7-16) (“[Ms. Scott] thought that she was entitled – and I agreed – to
some compensation” from J.O.).)
Overall, J.O. paid $110,000 in settlement to Ms. Scott through three wire
transfers of $40,000, $20,000, and $50,000. (R.2249.) After outlining the terms of
the proposal to Ms. Scott, J.O. wrote, “Also, though I believe you have no cause
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against me I would also like you to sign a release from all future claims. Only the
attorney would win on that one.” (R.2268.)
J.O. wanted his Porsche back from Ms. Scott and indicated that as part of their
separation, she could not keep the car. (R.2249.) He suggested that Ms. Scott find a
new car she liked, and indicated that he was willing to give her money to lease the
car for the first year or pay her $36,000 to buy a car. (Id.) Ms. Scott held both J.O.’s
car and the keys to the Rancho Santa Fe house until she received the final $50,000
installment from him. On May 24, 2011, she wrote:
I will agree to tell you where your car is, have both garage door openers
and a full tank of gas in it. I will mail both keys to 4315 Via Ravello
immediately upon receiving 50K in my chase account #XXXXX
routing #XXXXXXX. When the money is in my account, you may
consider this email as the disclaimer to any and all future claims against
you.”
(R.2249 (emphasis in original).) The following day, she wrote:
Your car is at the airport short term parking 3rd level, I wrote the
coordinates on the ticket. The ticket along with your Rolex, and the
keys are in your mailbox in a small plastic bag . . . You stole my dream
of Rancho Santa Fe . . .There you are in the house you bought for US
alone.
(R.2250 (emphasis in original).)
None of J.O.’s prior dating relationships had ended with a financial settlement.
None of his prior girlfriends had been given keys or other unattended access to his
Salt Lake home. None of them had been authorized to use his credit cards. He had
not paid for any medical care for any prior girlfriends. Other than one gift for a
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girlfriend’s son who was leaving on a mission, J.O. did not give substantial gifts to
the children of other girlfriends. He did not give any prior girlfriends advice on how
to use their alimony money. (R.3050, p. 156:14-25; id., p. 157:9-20.)
Ms. Scott has had “many boyfriends” whose credit cards she did not use.
(R.3050, pp. 193-194:17-7.) Nor had any relationships with prior boyfriends ended
with a financial settlement. (Id., p. 194:10-15.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals did not err when it concluded that Ms. Scott cohabitated
with J.O. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that, among other things,
Ms. Scott and J.O.’s relationship was more than a serious dating relationship and that
they lived together as husband and wife. Both the trial court and the court of appeals
rejected Ms. Scott’s claim that the couple’s time together in the Rancho Santa Fe
home was nothing more than a vacation.
For the first time, Ms. Scott challenges several of the trial court’s factfindings.
Ms. Scott did not challenge any of these findings in the court of appeals. Instead,
she simply construed (and continues to construe) the evidence in her favor and
disregards the trial court’s contrary interpretation. Ms. Scott’s arguments
misapprehend her burden on appeal. The trial court’s factfindings are reviewed for
clear error. To successfully challenge these findings, Ms. Scott must have clearly
raised her challenges in the court of appeals by addressing the evidence that
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supported the trial court’s findings, and then demonstrating that the trial court’s
reliance on this evidence was clear error. Ms. Scott, however, never preserved any of
the challenges that she makes now and the court of appeals did not err in referencing
the trial court’s findings of fact.
The court of appeals did not err in concluding that Ms. Scott cohabitated with
J.O. Under Utah law, cohabitation is defined according to its ordinary meaning—to
live together as husband and wife. The definition of cohabitation is not confined to
any preconceived elements because not all marriages are the same.

Instead,

cohabitation turns on whether the couple’s relationship has certain “hallmarks of
marriage.”

These “hallmarks” generally fall within two categories: (1) shared

residence(s), and (2) shared common household, involving shared expenses, shared
decisions, shared space, shared meals, etc.
In this case, the court of appeals did not err in recognizing that Ms. Scott
shared a common residence with J.O. at the Rancho Santa Fe home. This conclusion
was supported by the trial court’s undisputed findings that, among other things, Ms.
Scott stated that she and J.O. purchased the house in Rancho Santa Fe to “grow old”
together; Ms. Scott kept her personal belongings including her furniture in his homes;
she came and went from his homes as she pleased, etc. The court also did not err in
finding that she shared a common household with J.O. Among other indicia, Ms.
Scott was given J.O.’s credit cards to pay for her living expenses, she shared
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decisions regarding major purchases with J.O. (including the purchase of the Rancho
Santa Fe home and the sale of her Salt Lake home), she shared a bedroom with J.O.,
and she shared meals with J.O.
Ms. Scott does not meaningfully challenge the court of appeals’ holding.
Instead, Ms. Scott advances three arguments, all of which are unsupportable and
inconsistent with Utah law. First, Ms. Scott argues that the court of appeals allegedly
erred because couples cannot cohabitate unless they share a common residence that
constitutes their domicile per the tax code and other irrelevant statutes. That is
incorrect. Utah does not prescribe to the same rigid “one-home” or domicile test set
forth in the tax code. Utah courts have advised against such a formulistic approach.
Ms. Scott’s approach ignores the context of this case. Moreover, such an approach
ignores this Court’s advisement that not all marriages are the same.

Even if the

domicile test as set forth in the tax code were the test, the court of appeals did not err
in concluding that Ms. Scott and J.O. were not domiciled in their respective Salt Lake
homes. Ms. Scott moved out of that home. Additionally, she rarely stayed in that
home, but instead spent both her days and nights in J.O’s homes or on travel with
J.O. J.O. claimed that he lived on a full time and permanent basis with Ms. Scott.
Second, Ms. Scott claims the court of appeals allegedly erred because Ms.
Scott did not live with J.O. long enough to constitute cohabitation under the statute.
That argument is unpersuasive. Utah’s Cohabitation Statute does not set forth a
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deadline in which cohabitation is set to occur, nor does it allow couples who live
together in a marriage-like-living arrangement a trial period.
Third, Ms. Scott argues that the court of appeals erred when it terminated her
alimony because Ms. Scott and J.O. were no longer living together at the time Mr.
Scott’s termination petition was filed. Ms. Scott’s argument is not supported by the
language or purpose of Utah’s cohabitation statute or the divorce decree. Under this
statute, alimony automatically terminates upon the establishment of cohabitation.
Once a party has cohabitated, she cannot avoid the consequences thereof by one half
of the couple later moving out.
ARGUMENT
I.

MS. SCOTT HAS NOT PRESERVED HER CHALLENGES TO THE
TRIAL COURT’S FACTFINDINGS.
On certiorari review, this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals,

and not that of the trial court. Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, P.C., 2016 UT 7, ¶
11, 367 P.3d 1006. Despite this Court’s limited jurisdiction, Ms. Scott raises
several factual challenges of which she never sought review in the court of appeals.
For instance, Ms. Scott claims that the panel allegedly erred by stating that “Jillian
and [J.O] brought significant household property together in one place” at the
Rancho Santa Fe home. (App. Br. 39.) She also argues that the court of appeals
allegedly erred when it found that Ms. Scott and J.O. were engaged. Finally, Ms.
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Scott challenges the court’s statement that Ms. Scott’s daughter—Scarlett—
“moved in with the couple.” (Id., 41.)
There is a fundamental problem with Ms. Scott’s attribution of error to the
court of appeals. The court of appeals did not make these findings—the trial court
did.6

Nowhere in Ms. Scott’s brief to the court of appeals did she make the

sufficiency of the evidence arguments that she makes now. Indeed, in her reply
brief to the court of appeals, Ms. Scott clarified that she was not making a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge. (Ct App. Reply Br., pp. 1 & 4-5.)
Consistently, the court of appeals never analyzed whether any of the trial court’s
factfindings were clearly erroneous. Scott, 2016 UT App. 31. Because Ms. Scott
did not preserve her sufficiency of the evidence arguments, this Court should
decline to review them on appeal.
In any event, even had this issue been preserved, the trial court’s findings are
not clearly erroneous.

The standard of review in cohabitation cases has two

components: First, the court’s factual conclusions are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. Levin v. Carlton-Levin, 2014 UT App 3, ¶ 9, 318 P.3d 1177.
See R.2266 (trial court’s finding that “Petitioner moved a significant amount of
furniture and belonging to the Rancho Santa Fe home and employed professional
movers to handle that for her” and that Ms. Scott and J.O. “shopped together to
further furnish the home”); R.2264 (trial court’s finding that J.O. proposed
marriage to Petitioner); R.2241¸¶ 22 (finding that Ms. Scott stated that the Rancho
Santa Fe home was being purchased for the couple as well as Ms. Scott’s daughter
to live in together).
6
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All evidence in the case, and reasonable inferences therefrom, are construed in
favor of the court’s factfindings. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 30, 326 P.3d 645.
The court’s ultimate conclusion regarding cohabitation is reviewed for correctness.
Levin, 2014 UT App 3, ¶ 9. see also Myers v. Myers, 2011 UT 65, ¶¶ 32 & 37, 266
P.3d 806 (same).
Ms. Scott, while purporting to acknowledge these distinctions in the court of
appeals, failed (and continues to fail) to afford the required deference – or any
deference – to the trial court’s factfindings.

This is evident for each of the

following challenges she makes now, all of which are supported by the evidence:
 Support for the trial court’s finding that J.O. and Ms. Scott brought
significant property together in the Rancho Santa Fe Home, includes: Resp.
Ex. 3, pp. 5-6 (Ms. Scott’s answers to interrogatories detailing items that
were moved by Ms. Scott from Salt Lake to Rancho Santa Fe); Resp Ex. 6
(packing slip detailing those items that Ms. Scott moved from Rancho Santa
Fe back to Salt Lake when the couple separated); Resp. Ex. 29 (Ms. Scott’s
email to J.O. stating “we decorate [the Rancho Santa Fe home with my
furniture and the furniture that we pick out together” (emphasis added));
R.2247, R.3050 p. 104:9-11 (J.O. and Ms. Scott jointly purchased a couch
together); R.2245, Resp. Ex. 32 (J.O. had his Porsche shipped from Salt
Lake to the Rancho Santa Fe home).
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 Support for the trial court’s finding that J.O. proposed to Ms. Scott, includes:
Resp. Ex. 5, pp. 18-19 (Ms. Scott’s deposition testimony that J.O. proposed
to her at Liberty Park); Resp. Ex. 29 (Ms. Scott’s email to J.O. stating: “You
asked me to marry you, to spend my life with you.”)
 Support for finding that Ms. Scott’s daughter moved into the Rancho Santa
Fe home, includes: R.2241(Ms. Scott’s email stating that “J.O. was getting
into debt 4 a home for [Ms. Scott] and Scarlett.”); R.2249, ¶ 67 (stating that
Scarlet and Ms. Scott “would be out [of the Rancho Santa Fe house] by
Sunday the 15th”); R.2251, R.3050 p.27:10-14 (testimony that Ms. Scott’s
daughter, Scarlett, was going to stay in the Bridges, Rancho Santa Fe home).
Throughout her brief, Ms. Scott also makes other unpreserved, but more
veiled, challenges to the trial court’s factfindings. This is apparent as early as page
one of Ms. Scott’s brief, in which she claims that the court of appeals ruled that
“Jillian cohabitated with [J.O.] as of the moment they entered the California
Vacation house.” (App. Br., p. 1; see also id., pp. 8-10, 27, 30 (repeatedly insisting
that she and J.O. were simply “vacation[ing]” together in the Rancho Santa Fe
home).) Ms. Scott’s characterization of J.O. and Ms. Scott’s time together in the
California home as “vacationing” is in reality nothing more than an unpreserved
disagreement with the trial court’s (not the court of appeals) interpretation of the
evidence. The trial court did not find J.O.’s and Ms. Scott’s time together in the
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Rancho Santa Fe home to be mere vacationing together; rather, the trial court
found that Ms. Scott and J.O. intended the Rancho Santa Fe home to be their joint
full time residence where they planned on “sharing their lives together.” (R.226768.)
Ms. Scott also makes other similarly veiled attacks on the trial court’s
factual conclusions. For example, she implies that J.O. and Ms. Scott were merely
dating when they moved in together. (App. Br., 31; 39.) This characterization
conflicts with the trial court’s factual conclusion that “their relationship was
neither casual nor mere dating.” (R.2268.) It also ignores the couple’s own
testimony that there were many aspects of this relationship that did not exist with
others whom they had dated. See pp. 25-26, supra. Other examples of implicit
(but unsupported) challenges to the trial court’s factfindings abound in Ms. Scott’s
brief.7

7

Compare, for example, App. Br., 30 (claiming no support for conclusion that J.O.
was domiciled anywhere other than Salt Lake) with pp. 13-18,21, supra (evidence
that couple moved their belongings to California, evidence that J.O. and Ms. Scott
intended to grow old together in California home, evidence that J.O.’s significant
other had moved away from and had no intention of returning to Salt Lake, J.O.’s
statement that he lived on a permanent full time basis with Ms. Scott, evidence of
J.O.’s engagement to Ms. Scott); App. Br., 31 (claiming no support for conclusion
that Ms. Scott moved out of her house) with pp.10, 16, supra (evidence that both
Ms. Scott and J.O. hardly lived in Salt Lake and that Ms. Scott moved out of her
home); App. Br., 41 (claim that Ms. Scott never intended California home to be her
residence and that she was only staying in the home to recover from complications
associated with her breast surgery) with pp. 15-17, supra (evidence of Ms. Scott’s
intent to make the Rancho Santa Fe house her permanent home).
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Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure describes the requirements
that an appellant must meet when challenging a trial court’s factual conclusions.
This rule is generally referred to as the “marshaling requirement.” Under this rule,
“[a] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).

The marshaling

requirement includes both direct and circumstantial evidence. See Nielsen, 2014
UT 10, ¶ 47.
“[A] party challenging a factual finding or sufficiency of the evidence . . .
will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal if it fails to
marshal.” Id. ¶ 42. Moreover, an appellate court’s assessment of a party’s claim
on appeal is certainly affected (“and greatly undermined”) by assertions regarding
insufficiency of evidence when the appellant has failed to acknowledge material
evidence supporting the finding(s). Id. ¶ 44.
In this case, Ms. Scott did not clearly address her marshaling obligation in
the court of appeals. She did not indicate (or at least clearly indicate) which, if
any, of the trial court’s facts she was challenging. Instead, she intertwined her
challenge to the trial court’s factual conclusions with her legal arguments, thereby
implying these factfindings should be reviewed under a correctness standard. Ms.
Scott’s failure to adequately identify her factual challenges and marshal the
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evidence surrounding these challenges undermine her argument, and the court of
appeals did not err in referencing the trial court’s factfindings.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT MS.
SCOTT COHABITATED WITH J.O.
A.

Background of Utah’s cohabitation statute

Utah Code § 30-3-5(10) provides that “alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse
is cohabitating with another person.” This provision first appeared in the code in
1979. Prior to that date, alimony only terminated upon remarriage. 43rd Legislature,
Utah House of Representatives, Floor Debate, Disc. No. 5 (February 26, 1979
morning session). At that time, social mores were seen as preventing a receiving
spouse from cohabitating with a person of the opposite sex. Id.
By 1979, however, cultural norms no longer prevented a couple from living
out of wedlock. The Legislature was concerned that given these new social norms, a
supporting spouse would be left paying support despite the receiving spouse entering
into a de facto marriage. As stated by its sponsor (Rep. Pace), the purpose of the new
law was to establish a public policy that if a couple chose to “share the bed,” then
they must “share the board.” The statute allowed courts to grant supporting spouses
relief from alimony when the receiving spouse chooses to live with a person “under
conditions consistent with marriage.” Id.
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The cohabitation statute was amended in 1995. In the prior version, the statute
“predicate[d] termination . . . on a showing that the former spouse [was] ‘residing’
with a person of the opposite sex.” Myers v. Myers, 2011 UT 65, ¶ 18, 266 P.3d 806
(alterations in original). The 1995 amendment changed the language “residing” to
“cohabitation.” As Sen. Hillyard stated, the change was to bring the language of the
statute in line with the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Haddow v. Haddow, 707
P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). 51st Legislature, Utah Senate, Floor Debate, Tape No. 26
(February 16, 1995 general session).8

The term “cohabitate” more than “reside”

encompassed the intent of the statute, i.e., that if the receiving spouse has entered into
a substitute marriage relationship, alimony should terminate:
If someone really is cohabitating, they are living with another person in
that companionship relationship that is at least commensurate with
marriage, then alimony ought to stop. . . . . If they are in a substitute
marriage relationship, alimony ought to end.
51st Legislature, Utah House of Representatives, Floor Debate, Tape No. 1 (January
23, 1995 morning session).9
B.

Hallmarks of “liv[ing] together as husband and wife”

Under Utah law the term “cohabitation” is defined in accord with its
ordinary meaning—“to live together as husband and wife.” See Haddow, 707 P.2d
8

Available at http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_
id=15582&meta_id=477350.
9

Available at http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_
id=9294&meta_id=405408.
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at 671 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Utah Supreme Court has never
‘delineate[d] a list of required elements of cohabitation because there is no single
prototype of marriage that all married couples conform to.’” Levin, 2014 UT App
3, ¶ 15 (alterations in original) (quoting Myers, 2011 UT 65, ¶24). “What Utah
courts have done ‘is identify general hallmarks of marriage’ (and thus
cohabitation).” Id. (quoting Myers, 2011 UT 65, ¶¶ 23-24).
These “hallmarks include a shared residence, an intimate relationship, and a
common household involving shared expenses, shared decisions, shared space, and
shared meals.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted.) The court is not limited to
these factors, and may consider other hallmarks that are often associated with
marriage. See id. In analyzing such hallmarks, the ultimate question is whether
the parties’ relationship is “akin to that generally existing between a husband and
wife.” Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, ¶ 52, 355 P.3d 378 (quoting Myers,
2011 UT 65, ¶ 22).
In this case, the court of appeals found that the trial court made
(unchallenged) subsidiary findings on several hallmarks of a de facto marriage.
1.

Shared residence(s)

A shared residence means the “sharing of a common abode that both parties
consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of
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time.”

Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. In other words, the parties must intend to

establish a home together on a continuous basis.
A shared residence can be found if there is evidence that a couple spends
their nights together in a common home, and the couple can come and go from that
home without restrictions. See e.g., Levin, 2014 UT App. 3, ¶¶ 4; Myers, 2011 UT
65, ¶ 37; Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 911, 917-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Haddow,
707 P. 2d at 673. These factors are not exclusive, and courts are free to consider
any other factors suggesting that the couple uses the residence as a home. See
Myers, 2011 UT 65, ¶¶ 23-24, n.2 & n.3. Other factors that courts have considered
include whether a couple keeps personal effects at the home and shares expenses
for the residence. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P. 2d 159, 160-61 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
The first factor—spending nights at the home—is self explanatory, and
undisputed in this case. The second factor—whether a couple can come and go
without restriction—can be established by evidence that the receiving spouse has
been given a key or other evidence demonstrating that the receiving spouse stays in
the home when her paramour is not there. Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673; see also Sigg,
905 P.2d at 917-918.
The giving of a key is significant because it symbolizes unfettered access to
the residence in question. Other factors, such as the sharing of expenses for the
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home, are also helpful in answering this question, but the lack of such evidence in
a particular case is not dispositive. Myers, 2011 UT 65, ¶ 23; Haddow, 707 P.2d at
673.
Here, the court’s task in determining whether J.O. and Ms. Scott established
a common residence was made more complicated because they had multiple homes
and traveled extensively. The court, however, found an abundance of evidence to
show common residency. Among other things, the court noted that Ms. Scott had
been given a key to the Rancho Santa Fe home. There was also evidence that Ms.
Scott in fact came and went from that home as she pleased, even when J.O. was not
there.
Other evidence supported the court of appeals conclusion as well. The
couple themselves represented to others that they lived together on a permanent
full time basis. See p. 18, supra. Ms. Scott moved her furniture into the home.
When they split up, she said she was not going to “move back” to Salt Lake City –
odd language to use if someone has allegedly not moved away in the first instance,
as Ms. Scott claimed.
2.

Shared decisions, space, expenses, meals, etc.

Another factor relevant to the cohabitation determination is whether the
couple shared a common household. Factors indicating a common household
include shared expenses, shared decisions, shared space, and shared meals. See p.

39

37, supra. Again, these factors are not exclusive and courts may consider other
factors that inform the decision of whether the relationship is a de facto marriage.
In this case there were a multitude of findings that the couple shared a
common household. Among other things, J.O. supported Ms. Scott’s lifestyle by
giving her access to his credit cards. Ms. Scott used these cards to buy furnishings,
gas, groceries, entertainment, auctions, trips together, lodging, and major
purchases. See pp. 19, supra.
Additionally, the couple shared important decisions typical of a marital
relationship. For instance, when it came to purchasing the $2.5 million Rancho
Santa Fe home, Ms. Scott was in charge of retaining the realtor and had a
substantial say in which home would be purchased. She also took a major role in
decorating and furnishing that home. J.O. participated in the decision for Ms. Scott
to have breast augmentation, he helped choose the doctor and paid for the
procedure. The couple shared meals together, slept in the same bedroom, and took
all their holidays and vacations together.

Ms. Scott drove J.O.’s cars, and J.O.

gave significant gifts to Ms. Scott’s children. See 20-21, 5 supra.
There were other factfindings relevant to a determination that the couple
entered into a de facto marriage, not simply a “dating relationship.” Among other
things, Ms. Scott equated her alimony to fun money.
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See pp. 21-23, supra.

Implicit in this finding is that J.O. had not just been sharing Ms. Scott’s bed but
was also “sharing [her] board.”
Related to these findings is the trial court’s conclusion that J.O. had
proposed and/or suggested marriage to Ms. Scott in July 2010, and that the reason
they were not married already (even though they were living together) was because
Ms. Scott did not want to lose her alimony. See pp. 21-22, supra. Despite Ms.
Scott’s suggestion otherwise, this factor is certainly relevant. The very purpose of
the cohabitation statute is to prevent people from doing exactly what Ms. Scott
did—“clearly liv[e]” with someone without acknowledging it as a marriage to
avoid losing alimony.
Also significant was the substantial financial settlement that Ms. Scott
extracted from J.O. when their relationship ended. By entering into this agreement
the couple tacitly acknowledged that their relationship was something more than a
casual dating relationship: “[It] was a relationship with legal rights that may attach
which they duly resolved after negotiations and consideration of their rights and
liabilities.” (R.2268.)10

10

Ms. Scott devotes much of her briefing to suggesting that the financial
consequences of the cohabitation statute are somehow unfair to her or to women in
general. While her reasoning is far from clear (and would seem more properly
directed at the legislature in any event), it certainly would not apply to someone
like Ms. Scott who obtains a large cash settlement from the person with whom she
has cohabited. Moreover, she knew quite well what she was doing, even to the
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III.

MS. SCOTT’S LEGAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST A FINDING OF
COHABITATION ARE NOT SUPPORTABLE.
Ms. Scott did not meaningfully challenge the trial court’s subsidiary

factfindings, which were more than sufficient to sustain the court of appeals
ultimate conclusion that Ms. Scott and J.O. were cohabitating. Faced with rather
overwhelming factual evidence against her, Ms. Scott offers three legal arguments
for why Section 30-3-5(10) should not apply to her, none of which has merit.
A.

Ms. Scott’s argument that couples who live in more than one
home cannot “cohabit” is unsustainable.

Ms. Scott’s principal contention is that, as a matter of law, a couple cannot
legally “reside” in more than one home, even if they own more than one home and
regularly travel among those homes. Thus, according to Ms. Scott, if a couple
engages in conduct that constitutes “cohabitation” in every other way, they can still
avoid consequences on alimony by simply relocating periodically.
The court of appeals did not buy this argument, and for good reason. First,
Utah courts have never engaged in a rigid domicile or “one home” analysis. In
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, for example—where the couple each maintained a separate
home—this Court did not engage in a formulistic test to determine which of the
two homes the couple’s true domicile was and then determine whether the couple
shared that home. Id. at 673-74. Rather, this Court focused on whether the couple
point of taunting her ex-husband with snide commentary (“hahahahaha”) on the
back of an alimony check.
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lived together in either one or both of the two homes in a marriage-like
arrangement. Similarly, in Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1980),
another case where two homes were involved, this Court did not employ Ms.
Scott’s “one-home” analysis. Rather, the question was whether the couple’s living
arrangements were akin to a marriage.
Second, the “one-domicile” formulation that Ms. Scott proposes is based on
irrelevant tax code principles. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 830 P.
2d 230 (Utah 1992). The purpose of establishing “domicile” for tax, as well as
other purposes, is not the same as the purpose for establishing “common
residency” for cohabitation purposes. Id.; see also Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App
37, ¶ 7, 107 P.3d 693. As the court of appeals correctly noted, the definition of
domicile as found in the statutes Ms. Scott cites (see App. Br., pp. 28-29), “focuses
more on the reach of local governments,” whereas the Cohabitation Statute focuses
on the relationship of the couple. Scott, 2016 UT App. 31, ¶ 19.
Third, the court of appeals correctly held that the “domicile” test that Ms.
Scott proposes is inconsistent with Utah law. As noted above, the “common
residence” test is meant to be flexible, and certain factors may weigh more heavily
in some cases than others depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Put simply, not all “marriages” are the same.
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This principle is illustrated by Myers, supra. In that case, the trial court
imposed a strict application of the elements for cohabitation and in doing so lost sight
of the ultimate question for its determination. The couple could come and go from
the particular home in question, both appeared to have a key, and they had an
intimate relationship. The lower court therefore concluded that they cohabitated.
The court of appeals reversed, and this Court affirmed, because under the
circumstances of that particular case, the factors employed did little to inform
whether the couple actually lived together akin to husband and wife. The wife was
living in her parents’ house and her living arrangements were clearly temporary. The
boyfriend was a foster child in that house. They were both “guests” of the home, and
the question the trial court should have asked is whether the couple shared the home
as “separate guests” or in a manner consistent with husband and wife. See Myers,
2011 UT 65, ¶ 39. The Supreme Court held that the “common residency” element
was not met because the couple’s living arrangements did not resemble those of a
married couple—for example, Ms. Myers slept on the couch while M.H. had a
separate room, they shared no common household duties or expenses, and the nature
of their sexual relationship was likewise not permanent. Id.
Following the Supreme Court’s guidance in Myers, the court of appeals here
focused on whether, given the couple’s multiple homes and jet-set lifestyle, they still
lived as husband and wife. Ms. Scott asks this Court to do what this Court advised
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against in Myers—i.e., ignore the facts of the particular case and instead follow a
rigid formula. The facts of this particular case, as found by the trial court, are that
Ms. Scott and J.O. lived in more than one home, and traveled frequently in between.
An artificial “one-home-maximum” test would make no sense in this context.11
Indeed, even in the tax context, the “one home” or “domicile” test has been
seen as problematic when it comes to the outer fringes of society (e.g., the very
rich and the very poor).

See, e.g., Texas v. Florida, 307 US 398, 429 (1939)

(Frankfurter, dissenting) (stating the idea of domicile when applied to the very rich
is a legal fiction); see also In re Dorrance's Estate, 163 A. 303 (Pa. 1932), cert.
denied 287 U.S. 660, 53 (1932), and Dorrance v. Thayer-Martin, 184 A. 743 (N.J.
1936), cert. denied 298 U.S. 678 (1936) (where two states independently
determined that a taxpayer was domiciled in their respective states).
Finally, even if Ms. Scott’s “domicile” test were adopted in Utah, and even
if the court of appeals should have ignored the couple’s mobile living
arrangements, the court was still correct in its analysis.

In a general sense,

domicile means physical presence plus the intent to return or remain.

See

O'Rourke, 830 P. 2d at 232, n.1. The question would then become where was Ms.
Scott domiciled? Was the trial court required to find that it was her Salt Lake
Nor would Ms. Scott’s argument make sense in other contexts. Under her
theory, a couple who traveled for a living, or who transferred frequently, or who
were in the military, or who do not have a steady home, could never qualify as
“cohabitating.” There is no support in the statute for this interpretation.
11
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house? As the court noted and Ms. Scott admitted, Ms. Scott was essentially never
there. She spent the vast majority of her days and nights in one of J.O.’s homes.
Id.
She put her Salt Lake house on the market in July 2010 and, according to her
own emails, moved out. She asked that mail not be sent there because she would
not get it timely, and by November 2010 she had switched to a P.O. Box. Even
when J.O. and Ms. Scott separated, Ms. Scott made clear to J.O. she did not intend
to return to Salt Lake. See p. 16, supra.
As for J.O., the court was likewise entitled to find that his domicile was
Rancho Santa Fe. Among other things, J.O. represented that he lived with Ms.
Scott on a full time permanent basis; Ms. Scott testified that “she and J.O. both
“hated Salt Lake and wanted to live in Rancho Santa Fe;” J.O. proposed to Ms.
Scott; and J.O. transported personal items and possessions to the Rancho Santa Fe
home.
B.

The court of appeals was correct in declining Ms. Scott’s
invitation to insert a deadline into the cohabitation statute.

Ms. Scott also claims that the time she lived in the Rancho Santa Fe home
was too short to amount to cohabitation. According to her, couples should be
given a trial-period to determine whether their marriage-like-living arrangement
will work. This Court should decline Ms. Scott’s invitation to interpret the statute
or this Court’s precedent in this manner.
46

While other jurisdictions have crafted their cohabitation statutes to specify a
precise number of days that a couple must live together before cohabitation occurs,
Utah’s statute does not allow for such a trial period. Compare S.C. Code Ann. §
20-3-150 (2002) (defining cohabitation to mean that the “supported spouse resides
with another person in a romantic relationship for a period of ninety or more
consecutive days”) with Utah Code § 30-3-5(10). Instead, this Court examines
whether the parties intended to enter into a relationship akin to marriage by living
together. See Myers, 2011 UT 65, ¶ 26 (“cohabitation is not a sojourn, nor a habit
of visiting, nor even remaining with for a time, the term implies continuity”).
This principle is illustrated by the Court’s holding in Knuteson, 619 P.2d
1387. In that case, an ex-wife (recipient of alimony) moved in with her male
neighbor after her husband became “considerably in arrears in his alimony
payments.” Id. at 1388. The ex-wife was thereby left destitute. During her twomonth stay, the ex-wife began a sexual relationship with the neighbor. During this
same time frame, the ex-wife worked diligently to garnish her ex-husband’s wages
so that she could quickly move back into her home. As soon as the ex-wife was
financially able to do so, she moved back home. In conducting its cohabitation
analysis, this Court found it significant that neither the ex-wife nor neighbor
“consider[ed]” the neighbors’ home to be the ex-wife’s “principle domicile for
more than a temporary or brief period of time.” Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 672

47

(citing Knuteson at 1399). The ex-wife always considered her living arrangements
with the neighbor to be a temporary or brief condition. In other words, by moving
in with the neighbor, the ex-wife did not intend to establish a settled abode with
him.
This Court’s decision in Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, and Myers, 2011 UT 65, are
in accord. In Haddow, this Court was asked whether an alimony recipient’s time
spent in boyfriend’s home amounted to cohabitation.

In making this

determination, this Court did not look to some arbitrary deadline. Rather, the
Court analyzed factors relevant to determining whether the couple’s actual living
arrangements in the boyfriend’s home were akin to that of a married couple. The
Court held that they were not: The ex-wife did not even have a key to the
boyfriend’s home and did not move any furniture or belongings (other than
toiletries) into the boyfriend’s home.
Likewise, in Myers, the couple only lived together for a short period of time
(during the “spring and summer of 2007”). This Court, however, did not analyze
whether this period was too short to constitute cohabitation. Instead, consistent
with its precedent, the Court focused on whether the couple entered into a living
arrangement akin to marriage.
In contrast with the foregoing cases, Ms. Scott and J.O. intended to enter
into a marriage-like relationship: “Their move to the California house represented a
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deliberate escalation of their relationship to something akin to marriage with all the
trappings of cohabitation.” Scott, 2016 UT App. 31, ¶ 24.
Ms. Scott lived at the Rancho Santa Fe home for approximately eighty-seven
days, from February 17, 2011 until approximately May 15, 2011, during which
time her financial settlement/separation from J.O. was finalized. Ms. Scott’s
suggestion that this Court give her at least two-months (or longer) to “try on” a
marriage-type relationship, just in case it doesn’t work out, is not supported by
precedent or the statute.
Moreover, the court of appeals erred in limiting the time of cohabitation to
six weeks. As correctly recognized by the trial court, J.O. and Ms. Scott were
cohabitating “at least by December 22, 2010, if not earlier, until the separation and
settlement of their claims in May 2011.” (R.2270.) Limiting the cohabitation
analysis to the time the couple cohabitated in the Rancho Santa Fe home was err
given the transient nature of the couple’s living arrangement.

(Id.) As of

December 22, Ms. Scott was spending almost every night with J.O., had unfettered
access to all of J.O.’s homes, and the couple had jointly obtained a home and were
preparing to move into it. A close friend testified that they were living together
during this period. See p. 16, supra.12

Ms. Scott makes much of this Court’s statement in Haddow citing Knuteson for
the proposition that a stay of two months and ten days did not establish a settled
abode. See Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673 (citing Knuteson, 619 P.2d at 1389. This
12
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C.

The court of appeals correctly decided that under the
cohabitation statute, Mr. Scott’s obligation to pay alimony
terminated when Ms. Scott began cohabitating with J.O.

Ms. Scott argues that the court of appeals erred in terminating alimony because
she was no longer cohabitating with J.O. when Mr. Scott filed his petition.
According to Ms. Scott, if a couple stops living together, the court can no longer
terminate alimony. There are several problems with this argument. First, Ms. Scott
failed to preserve this argument in the trial court. See Record, passim. Therefore it
should not have been considered by the court of appeals.
Second, Ms. Scott’s interpretation of Utah law is incorrect.

“The plain

language of [Utah’s cohabitation statute] indicates the legislature’s express
mandate that the order imposing alimony terminate automatically upon the
establishment of cohabitation, thereby eliminating any future alimony obligations.”
Black v. Black, 2008 UT App 465, ¶ 8, 199 P.3d 371; Utah Code § 30-3-5(10).
Utah’s statute is different from the cohabitation statutes of other states. A
number of states treat cohabitation or even remarriage as a change in circumstances,
which may nonetheless warrant the continued obligation to pay alimony. See, e.g.,
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-86(b) (2014) (authorizing superior courts to modify, suspend,
or terminate alimony upon a showing that the recipient “is living with another person

statement, however, cannot be divorced from the factual circumstances of
Knuteson. As discussed above, the facts in that case were that the couple’s twomonth stay together was always intended to be temporary.
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under circumstances which the court finds should result in the modification,
suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because the living arrangements
cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of that party”);
Fla. Stat. § 61.14(1)(b)(1) (2014) (authorizing the court to reduce or terminate
alimony upon proof that “a supportive relationship has existed between the obligee
and a person with whom the obligee resides”); Okla. Stat. Title 43, § 134(C) (2014)
(granting the court the power to reduce or terminate alimony payments if
cohabitation is alleged and there is “proof of substantial change of circumstances of
either party to the dissolution of marriage relating to need for support or ability to
support”).
By contrast, in Utah, cohabitation automatically terminates alimony upon a
finding of cohabitation regardless of whether the couple eventually separates or
terminates their cohabitation. See Utah Code § 30-3-5(10) (“Any order of the court
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the
party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.”).
This provision is both similar to and stands in contrast with the provision of the code
dealing with automatic termination upon remarriage. See id § 30-3-5(9) (terminating
alimony but not requiring court involvement). In cases of annulment, alimony can
be reinstated only if certain conditions are met. Id. (“However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
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party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and the payor
party’s rights are determined.”)
The Legislature chose not to include a similar reinstatement provision for
cohabitation.

Thus, once a couple has been found to have cohabitated, the

cohabitation cannot be undone. For example, in Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 161, the
receiving spouse and her boyfriend were cohabitating. Just prior to the husband
filing his petition to terminate alimony, the receiving spouse decided to end her
cohabitation.

The court still terminated alimony, finding that the couple had

cohabitated. Other courts have similarly held. See J.N. v. M.N., 2007 Del. Fam. Ct.
LEXIS 252, 2007 WL 5361879 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 23, 2007) (“The fact that
cohabitation may have ceased is irrelevant under the wording of Del. Code Ann. Title
13, § 1512(g).”); In re Marriage of Frasco, 638 N.E.2d 655, 660 (Ill. App. 1994)
(refusing to reinstate alimony simply because the couple quit cohabitating); McRae v.
McRae, 381 So. 2d 1052 (Miss. 1980) (refusing to reinstate alimony when cohabitant
moved out).13
The rationale for such a rule is apparent. If “current cohabitation” were the
test under the statute, then one half of a couple could simply move out any time a

Even if Utah law included an “annulment” type exception for cohabitation
similar to that provided for remarriage, Ms. Scott does not claim that she would
qualify. See Utah Code § 13-1-17.1 (criteria for annulling a marriage, none of
which include the length of marriage.)
13
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petition for termination is filed. Ms. Scott’s argument is not supported by the statute,
or by the stipulated Decree itself (which provides that alimony terminates “upon”
cohabitation).
IV.

MR. SCOTT REQUESTS ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Ms. Scott argues that the prevailing party on appeal should be awarded

attorneys’ fees under Utah Code § 30-3-3-(2). Ms. Scott did not cite this statute in
either the trial court or the court of appeals. (R.1882-83; R.2146; Ct. App. Reply
Br., 19.) Under Ms. Scott’s argument, then, Mr. Scott should be awarded his
attorneys’ fees as a prevailing party. In any event, an award of attorneys’ fees is
not appropriate under the statute.14
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm the court of appeals’
decision.

14

Section 30-3-3(2) concerns only alimony enforcement proceedings, not alimony
termination proceedings: “In any action to enforce an order of custody, parenttime, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court
may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially
prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees
or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters
in the record the reason for not awarding fees.”
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